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can the eu carbon tax the u.S.  
in retaliation?
Annum Rashedi
President-elect Trump emphasized pulling the United States of America (“U.S.”) out of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Climate 
Agreement[hereinafter Paris Agreement]1, despite the executive 
agreement ratification by President Obama earlier this year.2 In 
fact, Trump called for a cease of all U.S. tax dollars payments 
to U.N. global climate change programs and a withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement in his first 100 days in office.3 Contrary to 
Trump’s intentions, Article 28 of the Paris Agreement stipulates 
that a party which has ratified, as the U.S. did on September 
3rd, 2016, may not withdraw from the Paris Agreement before 
four years.4 Article 28 was artfully designed to protect against 
potential withdrawal of support by changing Heads of States. In 
response to Trump, current French Presidential-nominee Sar-
kozy said he would demand France and the European Union 
(“EU”) place a one to three percent carbon tax at its border for 
all products coming from the U.S.5 The purpose of this paper is 
to determine whether the proposed carbon tax would be innova-
tive, and if implemented by the EU, would it be a discriminatory 
measure for the carbon tax to solely be on U.S. imports.
A “novel” concept
The notion of a carbon tax is not novel unless it is used as 
a trade sanction. In practice, a carbon tax would be considered 
a type of tariff or a border tax adjustment (“BTA”).6 Under 
the Kyoto Protocol talks in December of 2006, John Hontelez, 
Secretary General of the European Environmental Bureau stated, 
“[BTAs] might be the answer . . . EU firms would be protected 
against unfair, carbon-careless competition from outside.”7 In 
contrast, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson hinted 
that a “specific ‘climate’ tariff on countries that have not ratified 
Kyoto . . . would be highly problematic under current [WTO] 
rules, and almost impossible to implement in practice.”8 Here, 
however, the Paris Agreement, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, has 
been ratified by the U.S. and the WTO rules are ambiguous when 
it comes to BTAs.9
BTAs are permissible under GATT’s Article III, “National 
Treatment” clause which allows for taxation on imports10 so long 
as the tax imposed on imported goods is no greater than the tax 
established for similar domestic products.11 Nonetheless, such 
a BTA may not be permissible under GATT’s Article I, “Most 
Favored Nation” clause because it does not permit taxation to be 
levied on one state and not others, equally.12 Thus, a carbon tax 
on U.S. imports could be framed as a WTO permissible ‘border 
adjustment’ of a domestic carbon tax but its success depends 
on other factors. Essentially, the EU would be using this BTA 
as a method of retaliation, a trade sanction for leaving the Paris 
Agreement after ratification, in order to protect the environment, 
incentivize “greening,” and make a statement to demonstrate the 
importance of the Paris Agreement.
Arguments before the pAnel
Although BTAs are designed with the intent of maintain-
ing economic competitiveness, the carbon tax on U.S. imports 
could be non-discriminatory if the EU could successfully argue 
that it falls under one of the exemptions of GATT Article XX. 
Specifically, the EU would likely argue that the carbon tax falls 
under two exemptions to the GATT, Article XX (b)“for measures 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant, life or health”13 
and GATT, Article XX (g) “for measures relating to conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources”14 because such a carbon 
tax would protect human, animal, and plant, life and health 
while endeavoring to cut CO2 emissions, slowing and eventually 
reversing climate change.
In response, the U.S. would argue an Article I:1 claim because 
the EU is clearly discriminating only against the U.S. and not 
other WTO members.15 Additionally, the U.S. could argue that 
the carbon tax does not fall under the exemptions embodied in 
GATT Article XX because the carbon tax discriminates against 
its imports as compared to EU domestic products or imported 
goods from other countries. Moreover, the WTO stands by two 
non-discrimination principles that stipulate a member shall not 
discriminate, (a) between “like” products from different trading 
partners16 and (b) between its own and like foreign products.17 
These two principles safeguard the world’s liberal free trading 
system from discriminatory measures, especially protectionist 
measures. Here, the proposed carbon tax would cover all U.S. 
imports entering the EU, so the definition of “like” products 
would have to be greatly expanded to include carbon footprints.
The EU could advance the argument that any product emit-
ting one ton of carbon would be considered a “like product” akin 
to any other product similarly emitting one ton of carbon.18 When 
it comes to BTAs and “like” products, WTO jurisprudence has 
consistently applied the recommendations of the Working Party 
on BTAs19 which determines “likeness” by (1) the product’s 
end-uses, (2) consumers’ tastes and habits, and (3) the product’s 
properties, nature and quality. A uniform carbon tax affecting 
all U.S. imports into the EU would not be reasonably attributed 
“like” product(s) status even if the policy objectives for such a 
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tax were considered legitimate environmental policy goals to 
address climate change.20
While a carbon tax may be a successful form of retalia-
tion to the U.S. abandoning the Paris Agreement, it may not be 
the most efficient use of a carbon tax since this tax would not 
comply with the EU’s international trade obligations under the 
WTO. There is no doubt that such a tax would greatly affect the 
U.S. in its trade and economy due to its close trading relation-
ship with the EU. The U.S. greatest concern would be leakage 
— carbon-intensive industries being encouraged to move out of 
the U.S. to countries where they will not be subjected to such a 
carbon tax — as this would be damaging to the U.S. economy.21 
While, the EU could have a short-term gain, both economies 
would suffer long-term, and the ultimate goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions would be undermined. A successful 
carbon tax does not aim to discriminate or openly act as a form 
of retaliation.22 For example, if the EU levied carbon taxes on 
all steel manufacturers, imports and exports alike, it would be 
non-discriminatory. The WTO would not likely find discrimina-
tion where a carbon tax is structured to follow domestic climate 
policy objectives, and does not discriminate in favor of domestic 
producers or favor imports from certain countries over others.23
Nonetheless, the chances of such a carbon tax surviving a 
WTO panel is unlikely. The EU could not successfully impose a 
carbon tax only on U.S. imports because such a carbon tax would 
be openly discriminatory and obviously targeted at one trading 
partner. The EU would have to narrow the application of the 
carbon tax to be levied on certain products made under certain 
conditions or lacking sustainable or “green” elements. Further 
such a carbon tax would have to equally apply to all imports of 
that product, not only U.S. products being imported. The WTO 
aims to prevent discriminatory measures that restrict the flow of 
trade, such a carbon tax while implemented for the greater good, 
combatting climate change, nevertheless, would ultimately fail.
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